The tensions between healthcare providers and patient and family advisory committees (PFACs): A comparative health system analysis between England and Ontario by Majid, Umair
Patient Experience Journal 
Volume 8 Issue 3 Article 10 
2021 
The tensions between healthcare providers and patient and family 
advisory committees (PFACs): A comparative health system 
analysis between England and Ontario 
Umair Majid 
University of Toronto 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pxjournal.org/journal 
 Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Majid U. The tensions between healthcare providers and patient and family advisory committees (PFACs): 
A comparative health system analysis between England and Ontario. Patient Experience Journal. 2021; 
8(3):88-99. doi: 10.35680/2372-0247.1562. 
This Research is brought to you for free and open access by Patient Experience Journal. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Patient Experience Journal by an authorized editor of Patient Experience Journal. 
The tensions between healthcare providers and patient and family advisory 
committees (PFACs): A comparative health system analysis between England 
and Ontario 
Cover Page Footnote 
This article is associated with the Patient, Family & Community Engagement lens of The Beryl Institute 
Experience Framework (https://www.theberylinstitute.org/ExperienceFramework). You can access other 
resources related to this lens including additional PXJ articles here: http://bit.ly/PX_PtFamComm 
This research is available in Patient Experience Journal: https://pxjournal.org/journal/vol8/iss3/10 
Patient Experience Journal 




Patient Experience Journal, Volume 8, Issue 3  
© The Author(s), 2021. Published in association with The Beryl Institute. 
Downloaded from www.pxjournal.org   88 
 Research 
 
The tensions between healthcare providers and patient and family advisory 
committees (PFACs): A comparative health system analysis between 
England and Ontario 




There has been a proliferation of patient engagement (PE) in healthcare activities. However, the concept of 
“engagement” has existed for decades; the first Patient and Family Advisory Committees (PFACs) in North America 
were formed in the 1970s. These committees are an important mechanism for involving patients and family and have 
proliferated across the healthcare sector. However, it is unclear how or why PFACs became the predominant mechanism 
for PE. The objective of this comparative analysis is to review the historical context and legislative imperatives that have 
contributed to the proliferation of PFACs in Ontario, Canada and England, United Kingdom. 
 
Keywords 





Description of Policy 
In the last decade, health systems around the world have 
experienced the proliferation of patient engagement (PE) 
in multiple forms and healthcare activities.1 Systems are 
increasingly integrating the principles of user involvement 
and consumer engagement into the design, delivery, and 
improvement of health services. Today, PE is widespread 
in activities such as health technology assessment, clinical 
guideline development, research, and quality 
improvement.2-5    
 
Despite its recent proliferation, PE has existed in certain 
areas of health for decades. The first Patient and Family 
Advisory Committees (PFACs) in North America were 
formed in pediatric hospitals and mental health service 
facilities in the 1970s.6 These PFACs involved children, 
youth, and parents in clinical care decisions, the design of 
health services, and quality improvement initiatives. Since 
the establishment of these pioneering PFACs, this 
mechanism has become widespread at multiple levels of 
the health system, especially in general hospitals and health 
service facilities. For example, a recent survey found that 
of 110 hospitals in the State of New York, 59% reported 
having a PFAC and 12% were developing one.7 Members 
of these PFACs influence operations, leadership decisions, 
and strategies, provide training and orientation on PE to 
non-members, integrate the objectives and principles of 
PE in other hospital committees, and conduct ongoing 
evaluations of their work.7 Similarly, in a survey of 102 
hospitals in the province of Ontario, Canada, 66.7% and 
57.8% reported at least one PFAC for clinical and 
corporate activities, respectively.8  
 
PFACs are a PE mechanism that allow for greater and 
more meaningful participation of patients, family, and care 
representatives in healthcare activities within institutions 
and organizations. In some jurisdictions, such as Ontario, 
PFACs are supported by legislative imperatives that 
narrow the gap between healthcare planning and service 
users. PFACs do not operate only within the hospital 
sector; they also exist in regional health authorities, 
communities, agencies, and subnational and national 
governments. There are three types of PFACs: general 
(focused on organizational issues), population-focused 
(serve specific communities), and condition-focused (serve 
specific medical conditions).9  
 
Goals of Policy  
PFACs serve a variety of purposes with regards to 
healthcare planning. In some jurisdictions, PFACs seek to 
accommodate a growing desire to bring healthcare 
decision-making closer to service users and improve health 
system sustainability by increasing the responsiveness of 
health services.9 These goals seem to have been prompted 
by growing citizen interest in greater transparency and 
accountability in healthcare; a desire that reflects the 
advent of consumer-driven industries during the late 20th 
and early 21st centuries.10 These goals were also bolstered 
by regionalization of healthcare. In Ontario, for example, 
the Canada Health Act (1984) set the precedent for 
provinces to plan and operate their own healthcare plan to 
better reflect the unique needs and priorities of its 
population.11 This Act enabled Ontario and other 
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provinces to decentralize healthcare decision-making by 
creating regional health authorities. The structure of these 
authorities rendered opportunities for greater and more 
meaningful participation of service users in healthcare 
activities.  
 
The Triple Aim of healthcare advocated for improving 
patient health outcomes while maintaining healthcare 
spending and enhancing the patient experience.12 A desire 
by healthcare professionals and decision-makers to 
improve patient experience also contributed to the 
creation of PFACs. Institutional pressures to improve 
patients’ experiences, patient-centered care, and PE 
strengthened the position of PFACs in healthcare. In these 
circumstances, PFACs may have been perceived by 
healthcare professionals and hospital decision-makers as a 
mechanism to achieve patient experience objectives by 
transforming the design and delivery of health services to 
be more inclusive and meaningful to patients, family, and 
care representatives. The spread of PFACs across the 
hospital sector may also reflect shifting policy imperatives 
that respond to calls by the public, including patients and 
family, for health policy-makers and professionals to 
exemplify higher accountability in healthcare decision-
making.13-15 These pressures have been reinforced by a 
strong need for transparency, dialogue, and partnership in 
healthcare activities, which provide strong policy and 
ethical imperatives for the meaningful involvement of 
patients. PFACs may also serve as a policy lever to 
advocate for greater collaboration with patients in 
designing health services to be more relevant, appropriate, 
and useful to them, which creates health services that are 
of higher quality, more sustainable, acceptable to end-
users, and cost-efficient for health systems.16-17  
 
An assumption in these efforts has been that by engaging 
patients, family, and care representatives in discussions on 
emergent health care issues, the responsiveness of health 
services will improve, and accordingly, health services will 
become more sustainable. This understanding stems from 
the belief that diverse stakeholder input improves the 
sustainability and quality of services that also improves 
their legitimacy, uptake, and sustainment.18 However, it 
appears that governments and health service organizations 
may have used PFACs tokenistically in some instances to 
achieve symbolic goals of perceived transparency and 
accountability without the necessary legwork to involve 
patients and family in ways that truly transform the design 
and delivery of health services. Moreover, some healthcare 
professionals may employ PFACs to support existing ways 
of practice and legitimize existing interventions and 
innovations. As this paper will demonstrate, this 
observation is perhaps reflected in the tension between 
localism (i.e., responsiveness and alignment of health 
services to users) as represented by patients, family, 
citizens, and communities, and standardization (i.e., 
consistency in quality and processes of health services) by 
decision-makers and healthcare professionals.  
 
Materials and Methods 
 
This analysis will examine the historical contexts and 
legislative imperatives that have contributed to the 
proliferation of PFACs. This objective will serve as the 
foundation for analyzing the tensions that may exist 
between patients and healthcare professionals, most 
notably, physician groups, and whether these tensions are 
represented in broader policy statements, documents, and 
communications. This comparative policy analysis will 
occur between the province of Ontario, Canada, and 
England, United Kingdom (UK). These two jurisdictions 
were chosen because they possess several structural 
similarities and relevant dissimilarities that may be 
meaningful to determine the factors that have contributed 
to the proliferation of PFACs. Canada is a federalism with 
a highly decentralized health system within each of the 
provinces. The federal government holds an oversight role 
that provides cash transfers to provinces predicated on the 
five principles of the Canada Health Act (public 
administration, comprehensiveness, universality, 
accessibility, and portability).19 Ontario’s system is 
administered at the provincial level through the Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC), which is 
managed by the Minster of Health. The system was 
previously divided into 14 regional health authorities 
referred to Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs).20 
LHINs were developed to ensure that health services are 
integrated at the local level and responsive to the needs 
and preferences of patients. With the exception of 
physician services, LHINs are responsible for the 
administration of hospitals, long-term care homes, home 
and community care, community support service agencies, 
mental health and addiction agencies, and community 
health centres.20 More recently, Ontario went through a 
regional restructuring that created Ontario Health Teams 
to replace the LHIN structure. For the purposes of this 
paper, I will focus on the previous LHIN structure.  
 
Health care in England is more centralized than Ontario 
because it is stewarded at the federal level by The 
Department of Health and administered by the National 
Health Service (NHS). The NHS sets priorities and provides 
an overall direction to improve healthcare outcomes of 
citizens.21 Before the 20th century, the UK was a 
centralized unitary state. However, due to shifts in political 
structures and institutions, UK has become a quasi-
federation; containing elements of decentralization but 
important elements of centralization have been 
maintained. For example, the internal market reforms in 
the 1990s allowed hospitals and physicians to become 
private providers of health services.22 As such, physicians’ 
autonomy and decision-making capacity increased 
dramatically. Further, the organization and processes of 
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the NHS differs between subnational governments in the 
UK.23 For the context of this paper, I will focus on NHS 
England where relevant data is available but will substitute 
my discussion with broader trends in the NHS across 
subnational governments when data is unavailable.  
 
Clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) are clinical bodies under 
the NHS responsible for healthcare planning and delivery 
of health services for designated communities.25 Whereas 
NHS is responsible for primary care services, CCGs are 
groups of clinicians responsible for secondary level care 
such as planned hospital care, rehabilitative care, urgent 
and emergency care, community health services, and 
mental health services.25 For most of the 20th century, the 
NHS has been divided into regional health authorities, 
which have decreased in number overtime and were 
eliminated under the Health and Social Care Act (2012).26 
Today, the NHS is managed by multiple trusts, legal entities 
independent from the government and accountable to 
service users that manage different areas of the system 
such as NHS hospitals.25  
 
This analysis was informed by policy documents, 
statements, and briefs from comparator jurisdictions 
relevant to PE and PFACs, which was found through a 
grey literature search. Relevant parliamentary and 
legislative materials (bills, acts, debates, and briefings) 
specific to Ontario were searched through the Legislative 
Assembly of Ontario, e-Laws, and CanLII databases 
accessed from the University of Toronto Library. 
European materials were found through the same process 
but through the European-specific function, and 
specifically England. This latter search was augmented 
with another search on relevant legislative databases in the 
UK. A previous comprehensive literature search on PE 
was utilized to retrieve studies that focus on the politics 
and/or policy of PFACs in comparator jurisdictions. This 
analysis does not only focus on hospital PFACs, but also 
the administration of committee-like PE mechanisms in 
healthcare. Moreover, there is muddling between patient 
engagement and patient and public involvement (PPI) as 
the latter appears to be the predominant term used in the 
UK. This analysis will focus exclusively on PE because 
public involvement is a distinct phenomenon with 
different historical and scholarly literature grounded in 
citizen empowerment that warrants a separate 
investigation. Tritter (2009) described PPI as the “ways in 
which patients can draw on their experience and members 
of the public can apply their priorities to the evaluation, 
development, organization and delivery of health 
services”.26 This definition differentiates between PE and 
public involvement and will guide the distinction between 
these two concepts wherever possible. However, it is 
anticipated that PPI may not be delineated in English 
policy documents. In such cases, this analysis will describe 
them together while noting that they are different 
mechanisms for participation. Moreover, “physicians” in 
this paper refer to professional self-regulated entities and 
their members.   
 
Two frameworks will be used to analyze and answer the 
research questions. First, interests from the 3I framework 
(ideas, interests, and institutions) will be used to examine 
the relationships between patients and other health system 
actors, most notably physicians.27 This analysis will be 
augmented by a second framework, Kingdon’s Organized 
Anarchy Model of public policy making.28 This model 
describes three streams (problem, political, and policy), 
which when congruent, present a window for making 
policy decisions. This model will be used to demonstrate 
the factors that stimulated the need to develop PFAC-like 
mechanisms in comparator jurisdictions, or alternatively, 
remove these mechanisms. By tracing different periods of 
time where PFACs were powerful in both jurisdictions, 
this model will demonstrate how the three streams can 
elucidate the symbolic, relational, and legislative enablers 
or barriers of PE. Two related concepts will be used to 
augment this analysis: path dependency (i.e., a situation where 
previously ratified policies become self-reinforcing in 
future policy formulations)29 and policy layering (i.e., adding 
new elements of a policy onto a stabilized institutional 
framework).30 This discussion will revolve around the 
decision-making capacity of patients and physicians. Decision-
making capacity may represent the veto points and power 
available to different groups in a complex system. This 
analysis adopts a technocratic perspective of power in 
healthcare – there is a limited pool of decision-making 
capacity available to healthcare interests, most of which 
will be given to healthcare providers by legislation. This 
characteristic introduces elements of tension between 
PFACs and physician groups that permeate in 
organizational planning and policy activities. As such, since 
this analysis focuses on PFACs, the most relevant levels of 
PE are meso- and macro-levels. PE at the micro-level (i.e., 




Factors the Influenced How and Why the PE Came 
onto Agendas 
England 
Historical archives describe provisions for PPI in England 
before the inception of NHS. A widely adopted 
mechanism during this time was friendly societies introduced 
in 1911 to oversee and manage primary care services.31 
Friendly societies were comprised of patients and citizens 
who would contract primary care physicians to practice 
within their community.32 At the same time, hospitals were 
governed by hospital management committees, which composed 
of local citizens including patients and religious activists. 
These committees were responsible for appointing 
physicians, controlling patient admissions, managing 
income and expenditure of hospitals, and overseeing 
medical care.31 Although these committees were initially 
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dominated by wealthy philanthropists, after 1914, service 
user representation exceeded other groups because their 
charitable donations to hospitals became the highest.  
 
Since these pioneering PPI mechanisms in healthcare, 
there has been ebb and flow with regards to patients’ 
decision-making capacity. Progressive reforms have 
contributed to these fluctuations, which for the most part 
of England’s history, have been in favor of greater 
physician autonomy and decision-making capacity. A 
historical analysis found that the British Medical 
Association (BMA) and its member primary care 
physicians disliked their relationship with friendly societies 
that stemmed from an employee-employer relationship 
characterized by employees’ belief that they were elite 
professionals serving non-elite citizens.31 There were 
regular conflicts between friendly societies and the BMA, 
which largely focused on remuneration and privileging the 
expertise of physicians over others. Some believe that 
these conflicts were bolstered by higher perceived social 
status presumed by physicians.31   
 
These disputes gradually led to structural reforms in favor 
of physician groups, such as the rebranding of friendly 
societies into approved societies that had control over 
insurance schemes but could no longer oversee the 
delivery of primary health care.31 As a part of this 
structural reform, the predominant funding model also 
changed from an annual, renewable contract controlled 
and monitored by friendly societies to a per capita 
payment controlled by insurance committees that 
comprised of elite professionals. As such, physician 
accountability shifted from citizens to industrial and 
professional elites of society.  
 
The introduction of NHS England and a universal health 
coverage scheme was a critical juncture that exemplified 
ongoing tensions between patients and physicians. The 
advent of universal health coverage appeared to have 
temporarily reduced the tensions between physicians and 
patients that had cumulated by the disputes between 
physician groups and friendly societies. At this time, it was 
assumed that patient interests were best represented by the 
medical profession.33 On the one hand, the previous 
unitary state had strong legislative provisions in place for 
PPI through friendly societies, although this decreased 
over time in favor of physician interests. The NHS Acts of 
1946 and 1947, however, removed all PPI mechanisms in 
healthcare.31 Due to conflicts between physicians and 
friendly societies, this negotiation may have been made to 
bring physician interests to the table of universal health 
coverage by removing PPI, so opposition to their 
autonomy and decision-making capacity could be 
minimized.31  
 
Interestingly, there is no record of public backlash after 
the removal of PPI from legislation.32 A historical analysis 
conjectured that due to high public satisfaction with 
regards to universal health coverage, mechanisms for PPI 
were underprioritized by citizens or they viewed that their 
interests could be advanced by the medical profession.33 
The introduction of NHS was a moment of temporary 
reconciliation. Institutionalizing health services that were 
free at the point of delivery reframed the way in which 
accountability and transparency were achieved in 
healthcare.26 Eventually, the need for PPI mechanisms 
started to rise with the inception of consumer movements 
in the 1960s and 1970s.10 Patient interest groups 
proliferated during this time, but these groups did not hold 
the same decision-making power as before the NHS.34 
Nonetheless, the reintroduction of patient interest groups 
ushered a new era of PPI. Disease-specific groups 
continued to proliferate in the 1980s.35 However, the NHS 
did not have the legislation or infrastructure to 
accommodate this emerging movement within the existing 
healthcare milieu, which created tensions between PPI and 
other groups.  
 
In 1974, patient associations attempted to introduce a 
Patients Rights Bill that would allow patients to refuse 
treatment. Patient associations were particularly concerned 
with using patients for medical education without their 
consent.35 However, the Bill was not successful due to the 
language and strong interests that opposed patient 
movements at the time.35 In the same year, the 
government introduced Community Health Councils (CHCs) 
as an attempt to accommodate service user interests in 
healthcare.36-38 This dramatic reorganization of health 
services was prompted by the emerging concern that 
patients were being used as subjects in clinical trials 
without their consent.39 The development of CHCs were 
championed by consumer interests and represented 
another critical juncture where for the first time since the 
NHS a mechanism was introduced that appeared to have 
strong legislative authority over the design and delivery of 
health services. CHCs oversaw services, assessed local 
needs, supported patients, advised on complaints, and 
participated in health planning.39-40 CHCs also conducted 
evaluations of existing services to reveal areas for 
improvement. For example, the Central Birmingham CHC 
recommended hiring interpreters at health service 
organizations to support staff to communicate with Asian 
patients.41 However, there was lack of detail on how CHCs 
would integrate into the existing healthcare system and 
how they would be evaluated.31 These characteristics 
would later contribute to their delicate position within 
NHS policy.   
 
In 1982, Margaret Thatcher considered disbanding CHCs, 
but this decision was not carried out due to fear of 
defensive outcry by the public.31 Public outcry was an 
important concern during this time because of consumer 
movements that were growing in multiple industries. 
However, certain policy decisions were made that 
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undermined the decision-making authority of CHCs. 
Multiple reports indicated that CHCs were regularly 
dismissed or not included in planning meetings with 
regional health authorities and trusts.31 Moreover, before 
the next election, the Labour government advocated for 
the broader role of CHCs in healthcare. However, in NHS 
Plan 2000, the Labour government eliminated CHCs, 
perhaps to appease physician interests.42 Despite this 
setback, there appears to have been a widening of 
discussion after this time surrounding PPI and its role in 
the NHS.43-49 
 
CHCs were replaced by Public and Patient Involvement Forums 
in 2003 that worked with NHS trusts to establish a system 
for PPI. However, an internal evaluation reported that 
these forums did not adequately reflect the voices they 
were meant to represent.50-51 Furthermore, due to 
budgetary cutbacks and opposition from physicians, these 
were eventually replaced by Local Involvement Networks 
(LINks) under the Local Government and Public Involvement in 
Health Act (2007).52 LINks had more decision-making 
authority than the forums, but less than CHCs.26,31 Their 
mandate was to use patient feedback and experiences to 
recommend changes to local health services, particularly 
commissioning local services and priority-setting, which 
partially resembled friendly societies in the pre-NHS era.26 
Around the same time, the newly elected Labour 
government in 2009 introduced the NHS Constitution for 
England, which included 25 patient rights.39 However, in 
2010, a white paper released by the government called 
Liberating the NHS proposed the abolition of LINks and 
introduction of Healthwatch England under the Health and 
Social Care Act (2012).24 The explicit objective of this policy 
was to strengthen PPI within healthcare. The mandate for 
Healthwatch was similar to CHCs and LINks but the 
organization reported directly to the Department of 
Health and could only recommend changes without any 
legislative power for enforcement.53-54 Healthwatch also 
did not have power over incentive mechanisms, 
remuneration schemes, and physician delivery practices 
whereas previous PPI mechanisms had some advisory 
power over these aspects.31 Moreover, Healthwatch has 
experienced gradual reductions in funding, with 
approximately 25% of their funding reported to have 
disappeared in 2014.55 
 
In comparison to previous PPI mechanisms, it appears 
that Healthwatch England was another attempt to reduce 
decision-making capacity of patients and citizens in favor 
of physician interests. There is an ebb and flow between 
the decision-making capacity of both parties. Even though 
physicians will continue to have greater leverage over 
structural reforms and policy directions, patient interest 
groups are stronger than before and increasing in strength. 
New reforms will promote the mobilization of patient 
groups; for example, some legislators are seeking to 
replace Healthwatch England with the old CHC model.31 
Ontario 
Compared to England, the history of PE in Ontario is less 
profound, which could reflect the lack of historical records 
on the topic that may have allowed a nuanced analysis. 
Some factors that bolstered PPI in England also occurred 
in Ontario, but their effects on healthcare were different 
due structural differences in the health system. Unlike 
England, there is no data available on whether there were 
provisions for PE in healthcare before the inception of the 
Hospital Insurance Act (1947) and the Medical Care Insurance 
Act (1962) in Ontario that provided universal health 
coverage for hospital and physician services, respectively.  
 
In an evaluation of PFACs in Ontario, The Change 
Foundation (TCF) – an independent health policy think-tank 
– found that some specialized hospitals (i.e., mental health 
and pediatric health institutions) were among the first to 
pioneer PFACs.9 However, there is limited data on which 
facilities formed these PFACs, when they formed them, 
and whether they exist today. Early PFACs were most 
often established because of adverse patient events and 
comprised of mostly patients and community members.9 
These pioneering PFACs, advanced greater and more 
meaningful involvement of service users, family, and care 
representatives in healthcare. General hospitals were much 
slower to adopt PFACs, which had not occurred until early 
21st century.8  
 
PFACs in hospitals and communities were supported by 
legislative imperatives of the Canada Health Act (1984). 
These imperatives may have been an outcome of the 
burgeoning consumer-driven movements during the 1970s 
and 1980s. In Ontario, these consumer movements may 
have contributed to one of the principles of the Canada 
Health Act – known as Public Administration – that confers 
regulatory authority to provinces to design and deliver 
health services.11 This principle provided provinces the 
legislative authority to plan, deliver, and operate a 
healthcare plan with funding from federal cash transfers.11 
This structural characteristic is also known as 
decentralization; subnational governments have greater 
autonomy and decision-making power over social services 
and public policy.56 One of the aims of decentralization is 
to narrow the gap between healthcare decision-making and 
service users and citizens.57 Therefore, the principle of 
public administration under the Canada Health Act (1984) 
as well as the burgeoning consumer-driven movements at 
the same time may have created a policy window for 
provinces to adopt mechanisms through which the needs 
and preferences of services users can be integrated into 
healthcare planning and delivery.26 In 2002, the Romanow 
Commission recommended developing mechanisms for 
citizen involvement in health policy processes to 
strengthen accountability and narrow the gap between 
taxpayers and decision-makers.58 This recommendation 
represented the first formal and explicit record of 
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involving non-professionals in healthcare activities as a 
solution to emerging problems. 
Some provinces have taken steps to further decentralize 
healthcare by forming regional health authorities. For 
example, the Local Health System Integration Act (2006) 
divided Ontario into 14 LHINs, allowing regions to 
determine allocation imperatives and cooperation between 
neighboring healthcare institutions. One of the explicit 
goals of this act was to achieve a more connected and 
integrated health system.20 As a result of further 
decentralization, this Act may have encouraged stronger 
legislative imperatives to pursue PFAC mechanisms that 
bring decision-making closer to service users.  
 
The Excellence Care for All Act (2010) was another legislative 
agenda that reinforced the need to place patient needs at 
the centre of health system planning.59 Due to bipartisan 
support, this Act contributed to greater participation of 
patients in healthcare activities. Ontario hospitals were 
required to obtain patient experience data, develop a 
declaration of patient and public values that would guide 
health service design, and create mechanisms for a patient 
relation process to solicit and improve patients’ 
experiences. Moreover, hospitals were required to involve 
patients and family in the development of annual quality 
improvement plans, as well as provide a description of 
their PE activities.60 This Act provided an imperative to 
create PFACs for hospitals who had not already created 
one. Moreover, for hospitals with existing PFACs, this 
imperative opened a window for increased funding to 
expand its operations. Even more important, this Act may 
have set the precedent for the Patients First Act (2016) with 
a provision for each LHIN to establish a PFAC that would 
discuss regional allocation imperatives, cooperation, and 
health system improvement.61 With both Acts, there were 
strong legislative imperatives in place to establish and 
sustain PFACs at multiple levels of health care decision-
making.  
 
In spite of these legislative imperatives, there were 
emerging tensions between localism championed by 
service users and subnational standardization of health 
services advanced by other stakeholders, specifically 
physician groups. In particular, the Patients First Act (2016) 
was opposed by the Ontario Medical Association (OMA). 
The OMA did not support the formation of committees to 
monitor the quality of health services, especially physician 
services62-63 because they believed it would undermine 
their role in delivering patient-centered care. It may be the 
case, however, that the OMA used “patient-centered care” 




There has been little research on the evaluation of PFACs 
in communities or health service organizations. The 
research that has been conducted was commissioned by 
non-government agencies or think tanks. In Ontario, TCF 
conducted a qualitative investigation of hospital PFACs in 
2014.9 They conducted in-depth interviews with 64 staff, 
patients, and family members across 29 hospitals with 
PFACs. As a part of this study, TCF also conducted a 
literature review of Ontario hospital PFACs to determine 
whether it was an effective mechanism for PE. They 
found that a minority of hospital PFACs conducted 
evaluations. The PFACs that performed evaluation kept 
track of participant meeting attendance, provided annual 
updates of achievements, conducted annual and monthly 
self-evaluations, created annual performance review 
documents, facilitated impact surveys of member 
participation, and designed and implemented a preliminary 
evaluation framework.9 However, TCF underscored these 
findings by stating that there is a general lack of 
information on the effectiveness of PFACs within 
hospitals and at other levels of government.  
 
There has also been no research evaluating the impact of 
PFACs in government agencies. At the time of writing this 
paper, there was an internal evaluation being conducted 
for LHIN PFACs in Ontario. However, Ontario is 
undergoing a regional restructuring that is replacing the 
previous LHIN with Ontario Health Teams. There are 
several PE evaluation tools available in the public domain. 
In a recent systematic review, 27 unique PE evaluation 
tools were found.64 Evaluation of PE occurs in many 
hospitals, including University Health Network in 
Toronto, Ontario.  
 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
(SWOT) 
Based on the analysis presented in this paper, a SWOT 
exercise was conducted to determine the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that PFACs and 
related PE mechanisms face in 21st century healthcare. 
Table 1 presented the findings of this exercise. These 
findings are discussed in more detail in the following 
sections.  
  
Comparative Analysis and Discussion 
 
This paper reveals multiple lessons for PE in jurisdictions 
around the world. The implicit message has been that 
there is a constant, tacit tension between patient and other 
interests, most notably physicians with regards to decision-
making capacity in healthcare. For some part of England’s 
history, this tension exemplified the conflict between 
localism championed by patients and citizens and 
standardization bolstered by physicians and other interests. 
The analysis of Ontario and England shows that this 
tension is tacit within the negotiations made by 
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governments for new health legislation. In England, for 
example, provider interests did not support PPI because of 
a belief that it opposed national standards, optimal 
resource allocation imperatives, the value of expert 
medical judgement, and autonomous decision-making. 
This conflict likely prompted ongoing dispute between 
friendly societies and physician groups in the pre-NHS era, 
which cumulated overtime and may have contributed to 
the gradual reduction of localism in favor of physician 
interests.  
 
The persistence of these tensions ultimately led to ebb and 
flow between greater decision-making capacity between 
localism and standardization. Pre-NHS, England had 
strong mechanisms for PPI in the form of friendly 
societies in communities and voluntary committees in 
hospitals. With the introduction of the NHS, however, 
PPI had minimal legislative support. It was not until the 
consumer-driven movements of the 1970s that 
reinvigorated the need for localism.10 As a result of these 
movements, there has been a back and forth with regards 
to the power devolved to PPI mechanisms, which led to 
the formation of CHCs, then the forums, then LINks, and 
now Healthwatch England. Similarly, in Ontario, 
mechanisms for PE have been minimal, but since the 
consumer-driven movements, they have gradually 
increased overtime through several legislative imperatives. 
However, it remains to be seen whether the negotiations 
that occurred in England to reduce PPI mechanisms in 
favor of physician interests has occurred in the past or will 
occur in Ontario in the future. Nonetheless, practitioners 
and policy-makers in this area can appreciate the back and 
forth that exists between localism and standardization and 
some of the policy instruments and ideas they can employ 
to achieve their goals. This comparative analysis explains 
the possible factors that can contribute to tensions 
between interests and the ebb and flow of decision-making 
capacity in healthcare.  
 
Centralized Authority 
Boothe (2012) hypothesized that the distribution of 
decision-making authority in a nation determines the 
policy-making approaches.65 A more centralized nation, 
such as England, may be more likely to pursue big bang 
transformations, whereas a more decentralization state, 
such as Ontario, may take a more incremental approach 
because of the compendium of interests involved in policy 
formulation and implementation.65 Since there are more 
actors within decentralized nations, there are more 
opportunities to oppose big bang transformations that 
may support broader goals of increased PE. Moreover, 
incremental change allows multiple interests to bargain and 
negotiate. An incremental approach to health policy in 
Table 1. Results from SWOT Analysis 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Improves responsiveness and alignment of health 
services with patient/family needs and preferences 
• Narrows the gap between healthcare decision-
making and service users 
• Improves perceived transparency and accountability 
of health services 
• Increases legislative, political, ethical, social, and 
organizational imperatives for patient engagement 
• Early legislation formed a stable institutional 
framework for future changes to patient engagement 
through path dependency and policy layering 
• Big bang elimination of PE mechanisms may result 
in a gap in infrastructure with regards to localism in 
healthcare  
• Strong interests in healthcare may perceive localism 
as a threat to their professional interests 
 
Opportunities Threats 
• Expanding the legislative imperatives of patient 
engagement to reflect a balance between localism 
and standardization 
• Incremental introduction to patient engagement 
mechanisms is possible due to strong external and 
internal pressures  
• Formation of alliances between patient groups and 
other interests in healthcare (e.g., administrations, 
physicians, decision-makers) can create strong 
precedents for patient engagement in healthcare 
practice 
• Patient engagement used to legitimize existing ways 
of practice and interventions at institutions  
• Patient groups overpower physicians and other 
healthcare professionals in some areas of health 
service organizations 
• Continued risk of big bang elimination of patient 
engagement mechanisms in favor of physician 
interests for achieving broader policy goals 
• Arguments against localism that weakens the 
strength of patient engagement mechanisms, and 
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such cases may be the only suitable way to pursuing 
change.   
 
The analysis of Ontario may indicate that new legislation 
that supports PE and policy layering that bolsters PE can 
broaden the decision-making capacity of PFACs. These 
approaches can build a strong foundation for increasing 
the extent to which service users can participate in 
healthcare decision-making at different levels. However, 
big bang changes that broaden PE goals may have been 
attempted but not successful in both comparator 
jurisdictions due to a belief by physician interests that 
patient decision-making capacity may conflict with their 
own desire for autonomy. On the other hand, big bang 
transformations that seek to eliminate PE from healthcare 
may also be difficult to achieve. The one exception to this 
was demonstrated by the English case where the removal 
of PPI mechanisms may have been compensated by the 
introduction of universal health coverage. This policy 
decision was also made before the consumer-driven 
movements when patient groups were weaker interests, 
which made it an opportune time to use PPI as a 
bargaining chip to bring strong physician interests to the 
table of broader healthcare equity goals. However, with the 
proliferation of consumer-driven industries, localism re-
emerged as a strong force that reignited the discussions 
surrounding the role of patients in healthcare. This 
example shows that physician interests in some cases, may 
not support localism and patient interests if they have 
framed the conflict as impinging on their decision-making 
authority.  
 
On the flip side, it is also possible that patient interests and 
localism can be used by physicians as a political lever to 
advance their own decision-making goals, which was 
demonstrated by OMA’s responses to “patient-centered” 
legislation. Mold (2011) hypothesized that the lack of 
clarity in the “patient rights” movements allowed 
healthcare interests to coopt the language and narrative of 
PE to achieve their own goals.36 Therefore, it may be 
conjectured that in a more centralized state, healthcare 
professionals have less power that may prompt stronger 
opposition to any changes from the government that may 
affect their decision-making capacity. In a more 
decentralized state, on the other hand, professionals may 
hold more power and as such, may instead coopt PE to 
achieve their professional goals in negotiations with 
governments. Similarly, it may also be the case that PE has 
been used to align the political stream with the problem 
and policy streams to render windows of opportunities for 
transforming the extent to which patients engage in 
healthcare activities.  
 
From these two cases, it appears that building the 
infrastructure for PE tends to be incremental (i.e., 
incremental introduction) and removing provisions for it can 
be achieved through big bang transformations (i.e., big bang 
elimination) if there are mechanisms to compensate for 
losses. This parallel between promoting and removing PE 
mechanisms is a natural conclusion of the compendium of 
interests that characterize healthcare and often tend to 
maintain the status quo. This parallel between incremental 
introduction and big bang elimination is made possible 
due to the unequal distribution of power in healthcare in 
favor of provider interests. The power imbalance between 
patients and providers is longstanding in the history of 
medicine, and although it is less explicit today, this 
imbalance continues to permeate in broader legislative and 
policy activities as demonstrated through this analysis. 
 
There is a nuance to this contrast that is not captured in 
Boothe’s hypothesis of centralized authority and policy 
change. Overtime, strong consumer-driven movements in 
England led to the reintroduction of PPI mechanisms in 
legislation. However, this reintroduction was incremental 
in nature, possibly due to the diversity of and resistance by 
strong interests. It is possible, therefore, that an 
incremental approach to policy change may still be used in 
centralized states when there are diverse interests that 
oppose policy change. The important factor to policy 
change is how these interests are structured within the 
nation, and the veto points they hold to support or oppose 
proposed policy transformations.  
 
Path Dependency and Policy Layering 
An implication of the contrast between incremental 
introduction and big bang elimination relates to the 
tendency for path dependency in policy processes. Boothe 
(2012) asserted that if initial approaches and conditions to 
health policy development are limiting in a nation, then 
they become limiting overtime.65 This observation was 
seen in the introduction of NHS that removed legislative 
imperatives for PPI. This removal set the precedent for 
gradual reduction in decision-making authority of patients 
in favor of physician interests. Using path dependency as a 
framework for future policy formulations may have been 
supported by legislators’ need to negotiate with strong 
physician interests to achieve broader healthcare goals. In 
such instances, PE may serve as a policy instrument for 
legislators to sacrifice if physicians perceived it as an 
opposition to their professional interests. This finding is 
similar to Tritter (2009) who argued that the degree of PE 
has been a strongly influenced by law and policy developed 
in the 19th century – something that characterizes the 
effects of path dependency on PE legislation. Path 
dependency that resulted from removing strong legislative 
imperatives for PPI, as in the case of NHS England, made 
it difficult to introduce effective mechanisms for PPI 
thereafter (i.e., CHCs, forums, LINks, Healthwatch 
England). For example, Sustainability and Transformation 
Partnerships (STP) were introduced in 2016 to address the 
emerging problems of English healthcare.66 However, 
research has found that they lack adequate accountability 
to citizens and may represent yet another trend in the ebb 
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and flow of PPI in England that undermines the decision-
making capacity of patients.67    
 
The case of Ontario is characterized by ongoing policy 
layering with gradual introduction of legislation that 
cumulatively broadened the role of patients in healthcare. 
It may be hypothesized that policy layering may ultimately 
lead to a point where patients become more powerful than 
physician interests in healthcare. This outcome is similar to 
the function of friendly societies that existed before the 
NHS who were comprised of patients and citizens that 
determined the planning and delivery of health services 
within their communities. A PE mechanism like friendly 
societies has the potential for multiple, beneficial 
outcomes, for example professional accountability. 
However, PE must address important conceptual 
arguments, for example, that it opposes national 
standardization of health services, allocation imperatives, 
and medical judgement. Mechanisms for PE can be 
developed that balance the benefits of both localism and 
national standardization in a way that is negotiated 
between various healthcare interests. Another approach 
can be to reframe the meaning of localism and 
standardization whereby health outcomes, quality, and 
cost-effectiveness also result from localism, but require 
different infrastructure and legislative imperatives.  
 
Strengths and Limitations of this Analysis 
The comparison between England and Ontario presented 
interesting contrasts with regards to the factors that have 
contributed to the formation of PFACs and related 
mechanisms. On the one hand, England has had a 
profound history of PPI that allows tensions between 
different interests to be mapped and compared and 
elucidate how legislative factors have contributed to the 
ebb and flow of PPI. On the other hand, PE in Ontario is 
nascent, and it remains to be seen what tensions emerge as 
it is increasingly integrated in the milieu of healthcare. 
Lessons from England provide essential information about 
the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that 
Ontario may face as the desire for their involvement in 
healthcare activities increases. This information is vital for 
decision-makers and academics who contribute to a 
patient-centered legislative agenda.  
 
Despite the strengths, this analysis has two notable 
limitations. It may be the case that Ontario has had 
remanence of PFACs and related mechanisms throughout 
its history, possibly before the inception of Medicare. 
However, there are no historical records with this 
information. If such mechanisms have existed in Ontario, 
it would augment the current analysis, and possibly offer 
additional, insightful parallels with English PPI 
movements.  
 
This paper also assumed that legislators are “unbiased 
intermediaries” between patients and physicians. However, 
legislators and decision-makers have strong interests 
within healthcare as well. However, since the focus of this 
paper was to elucidate tensions between healthcare 
providers and patients, it was assumed for simplicity that 
other interests were neutral, stable, and constant. This 
position comes from the technocratic perspective that 
added a “critical” lens to this analysis. This perspective 
allowed problematizing the relationships and interactions 




This comparative analysis reviewed the historical contexts 
and legislative imperatives that have contributed to the 
proliferation of PFACs in England, United Kingdom and 
Ontario, Canada. This analysis found a persistent tension 
between patients and PFACs, and other healthcare 
interests. The persistence of these tensions emphasizes the 
ebb and flow of decision-making capacity between 
localism and standardization with regards to health service 
planning and decision-making. This analysis also found 
that building the infrastructure for PE has been 
incremental in both jurisdictions and current trends show 
that it will continue along this path, especially since 
jurisdictions adopt path dependency and policy layering as 
principles for policies that support PE. However, 
removing the infrastructure can be drastic if it is 
compensated by publicly driven priorities such as universal 
health coverage. This relationship between PE and 
broader health system objectives are exemplified in the 
relationships that exist between healthcare interests. It may 
be conjectured that a more centralized state, whereby 
healthcare professionals have lower autonomy compared 
to a more decentralized state, may prompt stronger 
opposition to any changes from the government that may 
affect their decision-making capacity, in this case, making 
provisions to improve the autonomy of patient groups. On 
the other hand, since professionals in a more decentralized 
state have more veto points may instead coopt the PE to 
achieve their professional goals in negotiations with 
governments and other interests. Practitioners and policy-
makers can appreciate the back and forth that may exist 
between localism and standardization. This comparative 
analysis explains the possible factors that can contribute to 
the tensions between interests and the ebb and flow of 
decision-making capacity in healthcare. This analysis also 
offers important insight to patients, decision-makers, and 
healthcare professionals on the factors that may support or 
oppose PE and the policy instruments and ideas that they 
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